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Seemingly paradoxically, over the past few years, India has seen a greater 
centralisation of foreign policy decision-making and the simultaneous rise 
of new foreign policy think tanks. Traditionally marginalised, India’s for-
eign policy think tank sector has gained in visibility and vibrancy due to new 
demand in the wake of India’s expanding international stakes. 
 • Foreign policy think tanks created in India after 2009 are more active and vis-
ible in the public sphere than their predecessors. This is partly because they 
have more funding and increased access to information due to a more support-
ive government and a more open Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 
 • The new think tanks’ greater visibility reflects a more intensive engagement 
with the government. Importantly, these think tanks have developed networks 
and set up new platforms to promote dialogue, including high-profile interna-
tional conferences, bilateral and multilateral exchanges, and closed-door net-
working events.
 • However, the growth of foreign policy think tanks in India has been mostly con-
strained to two distinct types: those which are close to Indian businesses and/
or connected to foreign think tanks (and which tend to promote a liberal world-
view) and those which are close to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 
ideological and personnel terms (and which have contributed to mainstream 
nationalist ideology in foreign policy and are dependent on their close links to 
the current government for their influence).
Policy Implications
Due to their expanding roles and particular connections, a number of Indian 
foreign policy think tanks have become important players to watch and engage 
with. There is, however, substantial variance within the Indian foreign policy 
think tank sector when it comes to quality of research, roles performed, and rela-
tions with the government. European policymakers and other stakeholders need 
to be aware of the diversity in the changing landscape of foreign policy think 
tanks in India if they wish to engage in the most functional and effective way 
with these organisations.
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Putting Indian Think Tanks in Context
Under Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister since 2014, foreign-policy making 
has undergone an important evolution, adding to longer-term trends. Seemingly 
paradoxically, India has seen both a greater centralisation of foreign policy deci-
sion-making and the simultaneous rise of new foreign policy think tanks. While tra-
ditionally marginalised, India’s foreign policy think tank sector has gained in visi-
bility and vibrancy due to new demand and India’s expanding international stakes.
Examining Indian foreign policy think tanks is timely and important. As part 
of the recent growth of such organisations Asia-wide, the number of think tanks in 
India has more than tripled from 121 in 2008 to 444 in 2017 (McGann 2008–2018). 
According to the data collected by McGann and his collaborators, in 2017 India had 
the third-largest number of think tanks after the United States (1,872) and China 
(512). This delayed wave of think tank expansion follows the surge in think tanks 
that occurred in Europe and the US during the 1980s and the 1990s. The number of 
Indian think tanks focused on foreign policy has also increased substantially, and 
their earlier image as marginalised political actors corresponds less and less to the 
reality on the ground. Though we need to handle these think tank rankings with 
caution due to conceptual and methodological problems (see Köllner 2013), it is 
noteworthy that some Indian think tanks have ranked relatively high in them, indi-
cating a substantial degree of international visibility. For instance, in McGann’s re-
cent 2018 report the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) was ranked 
28th among top non-US think tanks worldwide, while the Observer Research Foun-
dation (ORF) was ranked 35th.
The term “foreign policy think tanks” here denotes think tanks that focus ei-
ther on international affairs or on defence and security issues. The term “think 
tank” is conceptually ambiguous and vague, and definitions thereof differ. Köllner 
(2013: 2) considers think tanks to be “organizations whose main mission is to in-
form or influence public policies (and in some cases also corporate affairs) on the 
basis of research and analysis provided by in-house and affiliated staff.” Research-
ers have drawn several typologies that distinguish between research and advocacy 
think tanks; partisan and independent think tanks; and publicly financed, privately 
financed, and for-profit think tanks. Such distinctions highlight that think tanks’ 
orientation and sources of funding are key criteria of differentiation. Indeed, it is 
important to remember that, despite their often-professed public purpose orienta-
tion, think tanks are organisations that are guided by interests and depend on par-
ticular sources of funding (see Ladi 2011). Consequently, although often presented 
as bridges between power and knowledge, think tanks are arguably a “manifestation 
of the knowledge/power nexus” and may help to serve the interests of dominant 
elites (Stone 2007: 276).
Understanding the evolution and diversity of Indian foreign policy think tanks 
today can help us to assess trends in Indian foreign policy and to identify (emerg-
ing) political dynamics in New Delhi. In the following we examine the profiles of 
the new foreign policy think tanks and how they differ from older organisations 
in terms of access to funding and information. We then clarify how these organi-
sations engage with stakeholders, notably the Indian government, and what their 
respective roles are. Next, we focus on the political orientation of these think tanks 
in the domestic context before presenting our policy recommendations.
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New Foreign Policy Think Tanks
Unlike their economic affairs counterparts, Indian international affairs and secur-
ity and defence think tanks have traditionally faced a number of difficulties which 
have curtailed their significance: a lack of funding (partly due to a lack of invest-
ment of the state and a lack of alternative sources); a lack of human resources and 
the dominance of retired civil servants in senior positions; and restricted access to 
information, hindering – with some notable exceptions – the production of rele-
vant research and the formulation of timely policy recommendations. Since Jawa-
harlal Nehru’s reign as India’s first prime minister and minister of external affairs 
(1947–1964), foreign-policy making has largely remained the preserve of the prime 
minister, while the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has traditionally been in 
charge of policy implementation. Thus, with the exception of a very few high-profile 
think tank leaders and public intellectuals, think tanks and other external providers 
of policy advice have not been influential in shaping Indian foreign policy (Markey 
2009; Mattoo and Medcalf 2015).
The landscape of foreign policy think tanks began to evolve in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, when active and retired high-ranking military leaders 
started to establish specialist think tanks to produce knowledge on defence-relat-
ed topics. In 2001–2002, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh created the Centre for Air 
Power Studies, staffed with retired top brass and ambassadors. In 2004 Lieutenant 
General Vijay Oberoi, a former vice chief of army staff, set up the Centre for Land 
Warfare Studies (CLAWS) to promote strategic thinking and new ideas in this se-
curity domain. In 2005 then defence minister Pranab Mukherjee launched the Na-
tional Maritime Foundation (NMF), which seeks to enhance dialogue on maritime 
issues, formulate policy advice, mould public opinion, and influence the national 
security elite on issues involving India’s maritime security interests. These think 
tanks organise numerous events annually in their respective fields, with the NMF 
being particularly active in this regard.
Towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium, other new foreign 
policy think tanks with a broader focus emerged and became active and visible in 
the public sphere. First, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) and the 
India Foundation (IF) were founded in 2009 by personalities close to the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – the party of Prime Minister Modi. The 
VIF and the IF claim to be independent organisations, unlike the lesser known and 
openly Hindu nationalist Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation  (SPMRF). 
Yet, both these organisations’ members and programmes closely align with the 
BJP’s. Second, the Brookings Institution India Center was created in 2013, and 
the Carnegie Center India was opened in 2016. They are international centres of 
the prominent US think tanks the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, but they are legally independent and their founding 
members are mostly Indian. Third, several think tanks developed through business 
initiatives have emerged or been recently set up. Although founded in 1990 as a 
Reliance Industries initiative, ORF has become particularly prominent in the past 
few years. The Aspen Institute India was created in 2004 through the collaboration 
of the US-based Aspen Institute and the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII). 
In 2006 it was renamed the Ananta Aspen Centre, which claims independence and 
has an Indian board and receives Indian funding. Outside Delhi, the Mumbai-based 
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Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations was founded in 2011. Its found-
ing members include prominent companies such as the Mahindra Group, Suzlon 
Energy, and TVS Motor Company. The size and means of these think tanks vary 
greatly. ORF is the largest organisation and one of the most well funded, having 
received INR 322 million in domestic and foreign contributions in 2017, with 57 per 
cent of this funding coming from Reliance Industries (see Table 1). 
As indicated by the above-mentioned rankings, some of these think tanks have 
become more visible internationally. This is partly because they have developed 
effective communication techniques involving the Internet, social media, and in-
ternational networks. More fundamentally, these think tanks have become visible 
because they are less constrained by the hurdles faced by older think tanks. 
Name Year of 
establish-
ment
Current head and per-
sonal background
Funding sources and 
budget (latest available 
year)
Indian Council 
of World Affairs 
(ICWA)
1943 Nalim Suri (director general), 
former envoy to China and the 
UK / M.H. Ansari (president), 
vice president of India
Central government, 
2017/18: INR 146.6 million
Institute for De-
fence Studies and 
Analyses (IDSA)
1965 Jayant Prasad (director gen-
eral), former ambassador to 
Nepal and Afghanistan
Ministry of Defence, n.a.
Centre for Policy 
Research (CPR)
1973 Yamini Aiyar (president and 
chief executive), expert on 
social policy and develop-
ment and daughter of former 
diplomat and politician Mani 
Shankar Aiyar
Indian Council for Social Sci-
ence Research, other grants, 
2016/17: INR 253.7 million
Observer Re-
search Founda-
tion (ORF)
1990 Sunjoy Joshi (chairman), 
former senior civil servant, 
former joint secretary of the 
Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas / Samir Saran 
(vice president), former vice 
president of Corporate Affairs 
at Reliance Industries Ltd.
Domestic and foreign con-
tributions, 2017: INR 322 
million
Centre for Air 
Power Studies 
(CAPS)
2001 Air Marshal Vinod Patney, 
Ret. (director)
n.a.
Centre for Land 
Warfare Studies 
(CLAWS)
2004 Lt. Gen. Balraj Singh Nagal 
(director), commander-in-
chief of the Strategic Forces 
Command
n.a.
National Mariti-
me Foundation 
(NMF)
2005 Vice Admiral Pradeep Chau-
han (director)
n.a.
Ananta Aspen 
Centre
2006 Kiran Pasricha (director), 
former deputy director general 
of the Confederation of Indian 
Industry
n.a.
India Foundation 
(IF)
2009 Various directors, including 
ministers of the current 
government 
n.a.
Table 1 
India’s Foreign Policy 
Think Tanks
Sources: Institutes’ 
websites, annual reports, 
newspapers.
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Name Year of 
establish-
ment
Current head and per-
sonal background
Funding sources and 
budget (latest available 
year)
Gateway House: 
Indian Council on 
Global Relations
2009 Manjeet Kripalani (execu-
tive director), former India 
Bureau chief of Businessweek 
magazine
n.a.
Vivekananda 
International 
Foundation (VIF)
2009 Arvind Gupta (director), Indi-
an foreign service officer, for-
mer deputy national security 
adviser and secretary, former 
director of IDSA / Ajit Doval 
(founder), current national 
security advisor
Donations, 2016/17: INR 
35.6 million
Brookings India 2013 Vikram Singh Mehta (execu-
tive chairman), former senior 
civil servant, former chairman 
of the Shell Group of Compa-
nies in India /
Harsha Vardhana Singh (exe-
cutive director), former deputy 
director general of the World 
Trade Organization
Foreign and domestic grants, 
2016/17: INR 39.6 million 
Carnegie India 2016 C. Raja Mohan (director), 
leading strategic thinker and 
analyst of India’s foreign 
policy 
Donations and grants, n.a.
Syama Prasad 
Mookerjee Re-
search Foundati-
on (SPMRF)
n.a. Anirban Ganguly (director), 
member of the BJP Policy Re-
search Department and former 
research fellow at the VIF
n.a.
More Funding and Better Access to Information
The new think tanks have more funding, as well as more diverse sources thereof, 
and increased access to information due to a more supportive government and the 
fact the MEA has become more open to external expertise. 
On the one hand, powerful Indian businesses have become increasingly in-
terested in India’s foreign policy. In the context of economic liberalisation and 
globalisation, economic and political issues have been increasingly interlinked. 
Additionally, India’s emergence as a rising power has increased India’s stakes in-
ternationally. Accordingly, corporations have been increasingly involved in funding 
think tanks since the 1990s.
On the other hand, the Modi government’s attitude of active engagement vis-
à-vis selected think tanks has partly lowered the barriers to access to information 
for these organisations. In June 2014 Prime Minister Modi indicated his openness 
to fresh thinking, arguing that “the input of intellectual think tanks” should be sub-
stantially enhanced for a better policy framework (PIB 2014). Think tanks were 
thus officially recognised as sources of policy advice or, at least, as providers of 
relevant expertise. In practice, some organisations have come to enjoy better access 
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to information. In parallel, the MEA has also become increasingly open to external 
expertise. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar announced in 2015 that the Policy Plan-
ning and Research Division of the MEA would look to employ external experts; the 
government subsequently advertised the possibility of three-year stints at the MEA 
(see Jha 2015; Sen 2015). In October 2017 the MEA also put a call out for consult-
ants fluent in Chinese for a new MEA think tank that would help to formulate pol-
icies concerning China (Mitra 2017). 
The MEA’s growing interest in working with think tanks, as promoted by S. 
Jaishankar, has led the ministry to collaborate with select organisations through, 
for example, organising events and providing funding. For instance, around 4 
per cent of ORF’s total funding for 2017 came from MEA grants. ORF is very well 
connected with the MEA, partly through its work with former ambassadors. The 
MEA’s change of attitude is, to a degree, explained by the growing needs of the 
overstretched Indian Foreign Service (see Markey 2009). In a context of increasing 
policy complexity and high workloads, the government has started to tap into the 
expertise and services that think tanks can provide. As C. Raja Mohan, the director 
of Carnegie India has noted, “given the complexity of policy, there’s scope for out-
side people contributing to it” (Mohan 2016).
Nevertheless, MEA’s opening up to outside sources of expertise and services 
remains limited. For instance, the new channels of communication between the 
MEA and some select think tanks are based on trust relations between individu-
als rather than on clearly demarcated institutionalised links between the MEA and 
these organisations. Moreover, funding is based on informal contacts as there is 
no official process to apply for MEA grants. While the current situation constitutes 
a clear improvement in terms of funding compared to earlier decades, the lack of 
formal funding options does not allow for open competition among foreign policy 
think tanks for financial government support.
The Multiple Roles of Think Tanks 
The greater presence and visibility of India’s new foreign policy think tanks reflects 
their greater engagement with stakeholders, notably the government. Foreign pol-
icy think tanks across the globe can perform a multitude of roles (see Köllner 2011). 
In the Indian context we can distinguish at least four roles. First, some think tanks 
provide expertise and assistance for designing specific policies. ORF, for example, 
helped to devise India’s BRICS policy. 
Second, a number of think tanks provide platforms for political dialogue among 
foreign policy actors from India and abroad, such as governments, policymakers, 
the strategic community. In this respect, the VIF and the IF have played an in-
creasingly important role by organising small exclusive gatherings and meetings 
with high-profile guests. In 2015 the Economic Times reported that the closed-door 
sessions hosted by the IF on Wednesdays had come to replace the Saturday Club 
meetings at the India International Centre as the “Delhi establishment’s prime talk 
shop” (Tripathi 2015). The IF has also been involved in organising Prime Minister 
Modi’s diaspora events during his visits abroad. Groups like ORF have also organ-
ised large annual conferences with the collaboration or participation of the MEA. 
The annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, a joint MEA–ORF initiative established 
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in 2016, serves to showcase India’s regional ambitions and leadership and helps 
the government convey its perspectives to the world. The 2016 ORF annual report 
presents the event as “India’s flagship conference engaging with geopolitics and 
geo-economics.” The 2017 Raisina Dialogue was opened by Prime Minister Modi 
and involved 800 participants including many high-level guests and 120 speakers 
from 65 countries. The forum has been positioned as a South Asian complement, 
and even a potential alternative, to the annual high-level security conference in 
Singapore, the Shangri-La Dialogue.
Third, some think tanks have utilised and further expanded their networks for 
engaging in informal diplomacy. ORF, in particular, is greatly involved in Tracks 2 
and 1.5 diplomacy, with the latter also involving government officials. The Aspen 
Institute India was also originally created to promote such dialogue with US part-
ners. Its successor, the Ananta Aspen Centre, has organised Track 2 exchanges with 
partners in various countries, including Japan, Israel, Singapore, and China. 
Fourth, in a context where the government carefully manages information, a 
few think tanks have become “platforms for the dissemination of information” by 
the government (Malhotra 2017). Modi’s abolishment of the media advisor post in 
his office led to the creation of new channels for passing on relevant information to 
journalists. Think thanks close to the government have come to function as signifi-
cant nodes of information exchange. 
The Blurring of Power and Ideas
The growth of foreign policy think tanks in India has been mostly limited to two dis-
tinct types of advocacy and research organisations: those close to Indian businesses 
and/or connected to foreign think tanks and those that are ideologically close to the 
ruling Hindu nationalist BJP and its related organisation, the Rashtriya Swayam-
sevak Sangh (RSS). This evolution seems to denote the increasing power of Hindu 
nationalism and of business groups in India (rather than a general pluralisation of 
the landscape of think tanks) and has several implications regarding the level of 
autonomy and the roles of these think tanks. 
The foreign policy think tanks that are close to Indian businesses and/or con-
nected to foreign think tanks have contributed to the diversification of the Indian 
think-tank sector by promoting worldviews that tend to be in agreement with a lib-
eral international order and by representing the interests of major corporate actors. 
These think tanks also place great emphasis on their high-quality expertise and 
new thinking. Carnegie India, for instance, appointed C. Raja Mohan – a promi-
nent strategic thinker – as its founding director, while Brookings India selected the 
internationally renowned Dhruva Jaishankar to run its international affairs and 
security-related activities.
The think tanks that are ideologically close to the ruling Hindu nationalist BJP 
and its related RSS organisation have contributed to mainstream Hindu national-
ist ideology in foreign policy. For instance, on its website (Indiafoundation.in), the 
IF presents itself as a “Foundation [that] believes in understanding contemporary 
India and its global context through a civilizational lens of a society on the forward 
move. […] It seeks to articulate [an] Indian nationalistic perspective on issues.” The 
IF has also established the Centre for the Study of Religion and Society, while the 
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VIF has set up its Historical and Civilizational Studies programme. Both organisa-
tions have used new platforms to disseminate their ideas. For instance, the VIF has 
co-organised with partners in Japan and Myanmar the Samvad Civilisational Dia-
logue (Samvad.Vifindia.org), a global Hindu–Buddhist initiative based on a cultur-
alist ideology and designed to “adopt principles of Asia’s age-old spiritual teachings 
of Hinduism and Buddhism to address modern-day issues threatening human civi-
lization” (Vivekananda International Foundation 2017). Narendra Modi promoted 
the format after a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The IF has 
held its Dharma-Dhamma Conference annually since 2012 to promote the idea of 
India’s interconnectedness with neighbouring countries, in particular in Southeast 
Asia, through Buddhism. By financing and cooperating with advocacy think tanks 
such as the IF and the VIF, the MEA has effectively contributed to mainstreaming 
the ideological tenets they share with the government, thus contributing to a sub-
stantial blurring of power and ideas (and their carriers).
This clouding also extends to lateral links between the IF and the VIF, on the 
one hand, and the government and the ruling party (in terms of leading person-
nel), on the other hand. For example, Ram Madhav, an IF director, serves as the 
BJP’s national general secretary and the RSS’s head of public relations. Another 
IF director, Shaurya Doval, is partner in a financial services company and the son 
of the current national security advisor, Ajit Doval, who himself founded the VIF. 
Meanwhile, IF directors Jayant Sinha and A.J. Akbar also serve as minister of state 
for civil aviation and minister of state for external affairs, respectively. 
Moreover, there are also links in terms of leading personnel among India’s for-
eign policy think tanks. The current head of the SPMRF, Anirban Ganguly, used to 
work as a research fellow at the VIF and is also a member of the BJP’s Policy Re-
search Department. The VIF’s current head, Arvind Gupta, served first as dir ector 
general of the IDSA (2012–2014) and as deputy national security advisor  under 
Modi until 2017. The former director of the CLAWS, Major General Dhruv C. Ka-
toch, is now an IF director. Based on Modi’s government reshuffle in September 
2017, these revolving-door and cross-linkage phenomena are likely to continue: 
Nirmala Sitharaman, an IF director, was promoted to defence minister, while her 
IF board colleague and the former railways minister, Suresh Prabhu, was named 
minister of commerce and industry. A closely knit elite network thus connects the 
realms of India’s foreign policy think tanks and the incumbent government, with 
powerful individuals serving as boundary spanners.
Policy Impact and Funding Issues
Their proximity to power surely lends visibility and prominence to the newer Hindu 
nationalist think tanks. Yet, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these think 
tanks are truly influential as organisations and what forms and manifestations this 
influence might take. Certainly, think tank visibility does not equal policy impact 
(see Köllner 2013), and impact is also hard to measure. Recent years have clearly 
witnessed the rise of a number of new foreign policy think tanks in India; though, 
political access (sometimes even political office) and direct leverage are tied to par-
ticular individuals. This seems to confirm Mattoo and Medcalf’s (2015: 279) conclu-
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sion that “the story of Indian foreign policy is more about the influence of certain 
individuals rather than institutions.”
In this context there has been a contradictory trend towards more visible yet 
non-transparent politics. On the one hand, the introduction of new agendas, the 
creation of new high-profile platforms, and the engagement of the MEA with several 
think tanks have created an environment propitious for more open policy debates. 
On the other hand, the conspicuous lateral links between some of the high-profile 
new think tanks and the incumbent government – as well as between the think 
tanks themselves – reinforce not only the risk of uniformity and orthodoxy of and 
among the think tanks concerned but also the opacity of their operations. 
We can also note that while some think tanks are today more at ease finan-
cially, the state has restricted funding for organisations such as think tanks in new 
ways. The National Democratic Alliance Government led by Modi has drastically 
curbed external funding for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). The Foreign 
Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), which regulates the use of foreign funding 
for “organisations of a political nature,” was amended and made stricter by Parlia-
ment in 2016. Following this, the Home Ministry cancelled the licences of more 
than 20,000 Indian NGOs, notably human rights NGOs, which meant they were 
no longer eli gible to receive foreign funding. This move, which appeared to target 
critical voices, was condemned by the United Nations. And The Hindu, a well-es-
tablished news paper, reported that the MEA cut funding to the Association of Asia 
Scholars and also discontinued its annual funding of INR 10 million to the Institute 
of Chinese Studies (ICS) in early 2017; it replaced this grant with a project-based 
funding model. Apparently, the ICS had not approved of the government’s stance 
on certain issues (Haidar and Bhattacherjee 2017a, 2017b). 
Players to Watch and Engage With
The world of Indian foreign policy think tanks has developed in new and interesting 
ways in recent years. In 2015 Indian journalist Prashant Jha noted the paradoxical 
combination of centralised power under the National Democratic Alliance Govern-
ment led by Narendra Modi and a greater openness of the system to “outside inputs 
and engagements” (Jha 2015). Today, this is truer than ever. The government’s and 
the business sector’s new demand for expertise and organisational skills has pro-
vided a select number of think tanks with access to private and governmental fund-
ing and more information. This, in turn, has increased their visibility in the public 
sphere and enabled them to take up new outreach and advocacy roles in coopera-
tion with the incumbent government.
Due to their expanding roles as event convenors and information disseminators 
and due to their particular connections to the incumbent government, a number 
of Indian foreign policy think tanks have become important players to watch and 
engage with. However, there is substantial variance within the Indian foreign policy 
think tank sector, since some organisations like the IF and the VIF are ideologically 
close to the government, while others – such as ORF, Brookings, and Carnegie – are 
closer to Indian businesses and subscribe to more liberal worldviews. As such, both 
groups represent particular vectors of influence on India’s foreign policy today. 
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As part of a new style of foreign-policy making under Modi, the greater visi-
bility and engagement of the new Indian foreign policy think tanks illustrate the 
government’s desire to project messages and to further India’s image at both the 
regional and global levels. India’s growing international status and ambitions have 
enabled new actors to be more involved in the country’s external affairs. However, 
the rise of new Indian foreign policy think tanks also exemplifies an ideological turn 
within the larger sphere of foreign-policy making, in which Hindu nationalist ideol-
ogy has become more prominent. 
The emergence and the multipronged activities of new foreign policy think tanks 
in India offer European policymakers and other stakeholders new opportunities to 
engage with the country’s foreign policy establishment. Policymakers and other ac-
tors need, however, to be aware of the diversity of India’s foreign policy think tank 
landscape in terms of ideological leanings, research capacities, and the convening 
power of the organisations involved in order to most effectively and functionally 
engage with the right kind of partners for the purpose at hand.
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